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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997, by which the Council decided to extend the initial mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) until 31 October 1997. It is also submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report on the compliance of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with the obligations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, as well as paragraph 16 requesting me to report on the drawdown of the military personnel of MONUA. The report covers developments since my last report, dated 24 September 1997 (S/1997/741).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1130 (1997) of 29 September 1997, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, met separately with both the President of Angola, Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, and the leader of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, to present to them the main elements of the above resolution and to review the status of the peace process. In close collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), Mr. Beye also held intensive consultations with representatives of the Government and UNITA to the Joint Commission, with a view to radically accelerating the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and various undertakings made recently by the parties.

3. The Joint Commission continued to be actively engaged in reviewing the implementation of the three major tasks of the peace process, in particular the demilitarization of the UNITA forces, the transformation of radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility and the normalization of state administration throughout the country. A government delegation travelled several times to Andulo and held extensive discussions with Mr. Savimbi and the UNITA leadership on various crucial issues. As a result of the action taken by the Security Council and a number of bilateral initiatives, some progress, albeit slow, was

made on all three fronts. In view of those developments, the Security Council adopted resolution 1130 (1997), postponing the implementation of the measures set out in resolution 1127 (1997) until 30 October 1997.

4. With regard to demilitarization, MONUA has actively pursued the verification and registration of UNITA troops, as well as the disarmament of the "residual" armed elements (see paras. 10-12 below). Several concrete steps were also taken with a view to transforming radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility. Following UNITA's submission of the necessary application for the establishment of a frequency modulation (FM) network, on 15 August the Government approved the licence of a private FM station named "Rádio Despertar" to replace the present shortwave facility and has subsequently allocated a frequency for that station in Luanda. Meanwhile, radio Vorgan significantly reduced the broadcast of hostile propaganda and, in many instances, its editorial comments have been supportive of the current peace process efforts.

5. Since the resumption of the normalization of state administration in UNITA-controlled areas on 20 August 1997, the process has been carried out throughout the country. On 18 August 1997, the Central Intersectoral Operational Group, the joint government and UNITA body established to promote and monitor the extension of state administration, adopted the plan for the first phase of the process, which envisaged that a total of 149 localities should be handed over to the Government authorities by the end of October 1997. However, as at 15 October, municipal and communal authorities had only been installed in 118 locations. The localities covered included Cuango and Negage, two of the five strategically important areas previously under UNITA control. In this regard, Mr. Savimbi informed my Special Representative that the normalization of state administration in Andulo and Bailundo, where the central headquarters of UNITA is currently located, would only take place following his return to Luanda. However, my Special Representative and the representatives of the observer States are of the view that this should take place within the month of October, if necessary with special arrangements to be agreed upon between the parties.

6. On 6 October 1997, the Central Intersectoral Group assessed the progress achieved during the first phase of the exercise. The Group adopted the programme for the second phase, which covers 173 additional localities where state administration has to be established.

7. The delays in the implementation of the plan for the extension of state administration have been due not only to logistical obstacles but also to political ones. While UNITA has been by and large cooperative in the installation of central administration, that cooperation has not been forthcoming after the adoption of Council resolution 1130 (1997). As mentioned in my report of 24 September 1997 (S/1997/741), inadequate communication and coordination, as well as security concerns, have impeded the process. Although the normalization of state administration has generally been welcomed by the population, reservations about national symbols, such as the anthem and the flag, and some concerns about the neutrality and discipline of the Angolan National Police have been raised by UNITA sympathizers in some localities. This problem has been quite acute in Cuango (Lunda Norte Province) and Luau (Moxico Province). In order to allay those concerns, the Joint Commission requested the

Civilian Police Component of MONUA to report on the total strength of the government police elements deployed to the areas formally under UNITA control, as well as on their armaments. To facilitate and accelerate the normalization process, MONUA has continued to lend its good offices and logistical support to both parties. In the meantime, on 11 October, my Special Representative travelled to Andulo to review with Mr. Savimbi the implementation of the demilitarization of UNITA forces and the extension of state administration and to impress on him the urgent need to conclude all major tasks as demanded by the Security Council.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Observance of the ceasefire

8. During the period under review, the military situation in the country remained generally calm and stable. However, tensions persisted, in particular in Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Huambo and Bié Provinces. Despite some restrictions imposed on their verification activities in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces, as well as in Andulo and Bailundo, MONUA military observers have managed to monitor all significant developments and verify allegations about ceasefire violations. However, tensions emerged as the result of the movements of government troops to the major diamond-producing centre of Cuango in Lunda Norte Province where state administration was recently installed; but following the intervention of my Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States, those troops were pulled back. However, UNITA continues to allege that the movement of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) in the areas represents a violation of the Lusaka Protocol and is aimed at destroying UNITA structures there.

9. Certain areas in Benguela and Huila Provinces are still seriously affected by banditry, including acts of armed robbery which are being perpetrated by, among others, the elements of the so-called Civil Defence Corps, whose continued existence the Government is now denying. On several occasions, the Joint Commission called on the Government and UNITA to cooperate closely in stopping the dangerous spread of lawlessness. The Government has promised to undertake security operations to apprehend and bring to justice criminal elements in the affected areas, which will be done within the framework of a plan to be implemented under the monitoring of MONUA.

B. Accomplishment of military tasks

10. As indicated in my report of 24 September 1997 (S/1997/741), the total strength of the armed personnel declared by UNITA to be under its control was 6,052, including those in the security detachment of the President of UNITA, the so-called "mining police", as well as "residual forces". Even though this figure is generally regarded as unsatisfactory, MONUA proceeded to verify the information by dispatching five observer teams to the locations where the above troops were concentrated. Despite the delays and difficulties in communication and coordination with high UNITA commanders, the registration and disarming *in situ* of those elements commenced on 25 August 1997.

11. As at 15 October 1997, 5,445 UNITA armed elements of all categories had been verified, with 5,148 of them having been officially registered after handing over 5,454 weapons of various calibres and approximately 1.8 million different types of ammunition. A large number of weapons and ammunition were surrendered separately at Mucusso at Cuando Cubango Province. Out of these, 59.86 per cent of the weapons handed over were found to be serviceable and in good condition, while 18.61 per cent were unserviceable and 21.53 per cent were serviceable but in bad condition. Although some additional major artillery pieces were surrendered by UNITA, communication equipment is still conspicuously absent. Only one high-frequency radio set has been handed over to the United Nations, together with two unserviceable Kaspir armoured vehicles. In addition, the quantity of the 7.62-calibre ammunition (for AK-47 rifles), which is the most frequently used by UNITA troops, amounted to only 66 rounds per weapon, which MONUA considers to be too low. The quality of surrendered weapons is also questionable, even though their quantity has slightly improved. MONUA is currently conducting a detailed reclassification of weapons and ammunition which may slightly change its final assessment of the exercise.

12. The residual UNITA troops registered by the United Nations included one general, one brigadier, four colonels, 24 lieutenant-colonels, 72 majors and 241 captains. Those numbers, when compared with the information available to MONUA, are still inadequate. Despite the promise made by Mr. Savimbi to my Special Representative during their meeting in Andulo on 24 September, no additional information has been provided to the United Nations on the total strength of armed UNITA elements. In the meantime, UNITA has provided the United Nations with a list of 140 additional generals and other senior officers who are expected to be demobilized. The Government has suggested that the demobilization of the UNITA officers in Bailundo be completed by 23 October 1997.

C. Status of the military component of MONUA

13. As at 15 October 1997, the strength of the military units and staff officers of MONUA stood at 2,563 and that of the military observers was 226. The repatriation of United Nations military personnel from Angola, as part of the overall drawdown plan, which was suspended in August 1997, resumed in September with the repatriation of some military observers and staff officers.

14. Having reviewed the status of implementation of the military tasks, my Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States believe that the presence of United Nations military units is still required to complete the demobilization of UNITA forces in the remaining three selection and demobilization centres and in the military centres for the war disabled. While demobilization in the selection and demobilization centres should be completed by November 1997, demobilization of several thousands of war disabled is expected to commence shortly and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit estimates that completion of the process will require a few months. Furthermore, the number of incidents that marked the extension of state administration in some provinces and the general atmosphere of mistrust still prevailing in the areas formally under UNITA control clearly indicate that the

presence of United Nations troops in Angola remains essential for the successful conclusion of the peace process.

15. I therefore believe it would be advisable, with the concurrence of the Security Council, to postpone slightly the drawdown of United Nations troops. Accordingly, the recently adjusted plans for the downsizing provide for the repatriation of a number of military personnel by the end of November 1997, with a gradual drawdown of the troops between December 1997 and the first week of February 1998, when the strength of the military component of the Mission would have been reduced to the level initially envisaged for MONUA, as described in paragraph 45 of my report dated 5 June 1997 (S/1997/438).

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

16. The Civilian Police Component of MONUA, which is currently composed of 318 officers, is now deployed to 46 locations. It continued to monitor and verify various activities of the Angolan National Police in order to encourage its neutrality as well as the circulation of people and goods. The Civilian Police Component observers have been active in assisting the Angolan parties in the extension of state administration, including by conducting public awareness campaigns and in monitoring the deployment of Angolan National Police elements to the areas where the central government authorities were recently installed. The Civilian Police Component also continued to verify the quartering of the rapid reaction police at 13 locations in different areas of the country, as well as the security arrangements for UNITA leaders. On several occasions, while carrying out those duties, United Nations police observers encountered restrictions and even harassment by local authorities.

17. The selection and incorporation of UNITA elements into the Angolan National Police and Rapid Reaction Police were concluded on 30 June 1997. Out of 524 personnel selected, 165 have completed their training. Others, including 22 senior ex-UNITA officers, are currently undergoing training in Luanda for eventual incorporation into the National Police.

18. Earlier this year, the Government suspended the process of disarmament of the civilian population pending completion of the extension of state administration into all areas formerly under UNITA control. It should be noted that the appeal to the population to surrender weapons voluntarily has not been very successful. There is an urgent need, therefore, to strengthen this aspect of the implementation of the peace process, which could be done by introducing material and financial incentives. In the past two months, there has been a further increase in banditry in various parts of the country, resulting in numerous losses of life and property, which only underscores the need to pursue vigorously the disarming of the residual UNITA forces and the collection of weapons throughout Angola; this is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of peace and security in the country.

19. At the same time, the free circulation of people and goods continued to be restricted by the existence of many checkpoints maintained by both the Government and UNITA, at which the civilian populations are subjected to indiscriminate searches and extortion. I believe that the overall security and

political environment in the country would benefit from additional training of the Angolan National Police and the Rapid Reaction Police in internationally accepted police procedures. MONUA stands ready to provide the necessary advice and training to the National Police in this important area.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

20. The human rights situation in the country remained the focus of attention of both the Civilian Police Component and MONUA human rights observers. The human rights component of the Mission has been pursuing various activities related to the promotion of human rights and individual protection within the programmes approved by the Joint Commission. It also conducted an intensive public awareness campaign in several Angolan provinces. While steps are being taken, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to strengthen the component, human rights monitors are deployed to only 7 out of the country's 18 provinces.

21. In close cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the human rights component has been making particular efforts towards the elaboration of programmes aimed at improving the country's judicial system. In that respect, the establishment of the National Commission for the Reform of the Penal Code is a welcome development. To assist in the administration of justice, MONUA prepared a document that reviews current penal procedures related to human rights violations. Furthermore, MONUA submitted to the Ad Hoc Group of the Joint Commission, at its sessions held on 23 and 24 September 1997, 22 cases of alleged human rights abuses. The Group confirmed six cases as violations of human rights and made recommendations for corrective action. In the meantime, a team of United Nations human rights monitors and Civilian Police Component observers participated in a seminar on the latest investigation techniques of human rights violations, which was recently held in Luanda.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

22. International relief organizations operating in Angola remain concerned at the lack of access to vulnerable populations in some areas of the country, mostly owing to restrictions that are still being imposed on the movement of humanitarian staff. There are also concerns about the continued influx of new internally displaced persons, the cancellation of plans for the resettlement of those displaced earlier, and incidents related to security and mines. During the reporting period, relief organizations registered more than 17,000 new internally displaced persons. Although the organized resettlement of internally displaced persons has been postponed, the Government and humanitarian organizations plan, if conditions allow, to resettle more than 19,000 internally displaced persons by the end of the year and an additional 19,000 by April 1998. In the meantime, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its humanitarian partners continued to provide relief aid to a total of 2,000 refugees from Rwanda and Burundi at a camp in Luau. Following the

recent extension of state administration in that area, the Government has given UNHCR permission to proceed with the verification of new arrivals in order to determine their status.

23. Despite the various appeals addressed to both the Government and UNITA, incidents resulting from restrictions imposed by local officials on the movement of relief organizations continued to occur. One such incident happened on 4 September 1997 when a joint mission, composed of representatives of MONUA, the World Food Programme and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, was denied authorization to proceed at the checkpoint on the river Luembe. As a result, humanitarian assistance has been suspended for several hundred internally displaced persons in the region. The Unit and its humanitarian partners are extremely concerned at this trend, which demonstrates a lack of respect for basic humanitarian principles.

24. Within this complex environment, and owing to the acute shortage of financial resources, humanitarian agencies continued to face difficulties in assisting vulnerable populations. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit has therefore continued active consultations with donors regarding the funding of various projects within the 1997 United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal, which was designed to enable relief organizations to respond to emergency humanitarian situations. While contributions of US$ 2 million from the Government of Portugal and $5 million from the Government of the United States of America are very much appreciated, the overall response to the 1997 Consolidated Appeal remains inadequate. There is an urgent need, therefore, to provide funds for major programmes, such as demobilization and humanitarian relief projects aimed at assisting the vulnerable populations and internally displaced persons. Unless urgent action is taken, those programmes will soon be forced to scale down radically. Therefore, I would like once again to appeal to the donor community to contribute generously to the 1997 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal.

B. Demobilization and integration

25. During the previous reporting period, the demobilization programme encountered serious difficulties as a result of political obstacles along the path of the peace process, a shortage of funds and transportation and logistical problems. Nonetheless, as at 15 October 1997, a total of 33,967 UNITA soldiers had been demobilized, including 31,178 UNITA elements within the framework of the rapid demobilization programme, under-age soldiers numbered 2,124 UNITA and 350 FAA.

26. The implementation of the demobilization process has been adversely affected by the systematic and unjustified changes by UNITA in the destination of its demobilized troops. MONUA has investigated those changes with regard to those demobilized from the Catala and Chitembo centres. The outcome of the investigation showed that some 279 troops who had initially chosen to settle in 175 different locations throughout the country were, eventually, settled in only six locations in and around Catala, an area in Malange Province. Some 1,291 troops from Chitembo, who had chosen to settle in 302 different locations

throughout the country, finally settled in only six locations, all in the area between Chitembo and Kuito in Bie Province.

27. Meanwhile, preparations are under way to initiate demobilization in the remaining military war disabled centres in Jamba and Biongue, which is scheduled to be completed in January 1998. The implementation of this operation depends on the continuing presence of United Nations military units, which provide security, as well as logistical support, to United Nations personnel, non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian staff in many parts of the country.

28. The Technical Working Group on Demobilization and Reintegration of the Joint Commission is finalizing procedures for the demobilization of all UNITA personnel who have not been incorporated into the National Police, the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE) and the Institute for the Social and Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (IRSEM). Also under discussion are the special procedures according to which registered UNITA personnel, who are absent from the selection and demobilization centres, will be demobilized by government institutions at a later stage. In addition, immediate consideration should be given to ensure funding for the demobilization of the FAA troops.

29. Since July 1996, UNDP and other donors have developed counselling and referral projects and quick impact programmes for the demobilized soldiers and have promoted vocational and employment training in order to ensure their smooth reintegration into civilian life. Vocational training and employment promotion activities were planned to start in September 1996. However, because of the slow progress in the demobilization process and inadequate funding, those activities could not start until February 1997. In the area of vocational training, 2,000 ex-soldiers have been enrolled in various courses in nine provinces. In addition, more than 9,000 ex-military personnel have been interviewed to participate in reintegration programmes and 2,260 personnel have received a demobilization cash subsidy. Furthermore, 26 quick impact social reintegration projects are operating in four provinces, providing for 2,163 demobilized soldiers. Another 200 similar projects are under review.

C. Demining

30. The Angolan national demining programme depends very much on adequate external funding. It was hoped that, with the deployment of 12 Angolan demining brigades to various areas of the country, the national mine survey would cover all 18 provinces by the end of 1997. However, owing to the extremely low level of funding and a shortage of demining experts, only seven Angolan demining brigades are currently operating. At the same time, it is estimated that there are more than 2,500 minefields in Angola. The information available indicates that, out of the 1,760 minefields surveyed, 1,249 are qualified as "high-risk". Of these, only 157 minefields have been cleared, in addition to approximately 5,000 kilometres of roads. The above demonstrates the urgent need for proper funding for demining activities in Angola, and I appeal once again to donors to provide the necessary assistance for this vital humanitarian endeavour.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

31. During the reporting period, macroeconomic imbalances in the country continued to persist. The Angolan economy is still seriously affected by considerable distortions, which have a very negative impact on the majority of the population. The Government succeeded in limiting the issuance of bank credit throughout much of the reporting period, and as a result, inflation was subdued. However, because the underlying fiscal deficit remained large, significant payment arrears continued to accumulate. Control on the growth of money and credit appeared to relax at mid-year, when government wage payments were regularized and a significant devaluation of the national currency was made. As a result, monthly inflation rates rose, and the differential between parallel and official exchange rates widened considerably.

32. The monthly rate of inflation remained at the single-digit level and stood at 1.5 per cent in July, 6.5 per cent in August and 4.5 per cent during the first two weeks of September 1997. However, the prices prevailing at the local markets remained excessively high. Although the delays in payment of wages and other government arrears have artificially kept the monthly rate of inflation at a rather low level, the regularization of the payment of salaries and the slow pace of the peace process will, in all probability, have a negative effect on the exchange rate and inflation.

33. With respect to the overall economic strategy, the Government, with the assistance of UNDP, has engaged a team of international experts to prepare a national medium-term policy framework, which will envisage strategic policy measures towards economic stabilization, recovery and development. In the meantime, the country continued to attract prospective investors, and several foreign delegations that visited Angola recently expressed interest in investing in a number of projects. However, many potential investors are still concerned as to whether Angola would be able to reduce the level of inflation substantially without implementing a radical adjustment programme.

34. The Community Rehabilitation Programme for Angola has been focusing on strengthening the Government's capacity in managing and coordinating related activities at the national and provincial levels. So far, US$ 9.7 million has been contributed to the programme through UNDP and has been utilized or earmarked for rehabilitating administrative buildings in the provinces of Bengo, Huambo and Uige. Rehabilitation projects are also being carried out in the areas of schoolteacher training, agriculture and health. Provincial technical units have been set up in 11 out of 18 Angolan provinces to coordinate the above activities. However, the implementation of the programme has been somewhat hampered by the slow pace in the normalization of state administration. Delays in convening the Central Coordination Committee, the governmental inter-ministerial body, has also reduced the impact of the programme. So far, a total of approximately US$ 41 million has been disbursed, while agreements totalling $214 million have been signed with the donors in the implementation of the Community Rehabilitation Programme.

35. At the same time, a capacity-building programme, which aims at strengthening the Government's ability to coordinate humanitarian and social reintegration activities, has been prepared with UNDP assistance. It is

expected that the implementation of the project will begin in mid-October 1997 and will last 18 months, with an estimated cost of US$ 2.9 million.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

36. Under the terms of General Assembly resolution 49/233 of 23 December 1994, commitment authority in the amount of $49,975,500 gross has been provided to meet the essential costs beginning on 1 July 1997 of the transition of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) to MONUA and for its maintenance, pending consideration by the Assembly of my proposed budget. The estimated cost for the 12-month period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 amounts to $162,138,000 gross.

37. The proposed budget provides, inter alia, for the phased repatriation of military contingent personnel from 2,602 at 1 October 1997 to 170 by 1 January 1998. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission, as recommended in paragraph 43 below, and concur with my intention to postpone slightly the withdrawal of the formed units, any additional requirements that may be necessary will be sought from the General Assembly during its current session.

38. As at 30 September 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM/MONUA special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 June 1997 amounted to $89.2 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 September 1997 was $1,747.5 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

39. Since the issuance of my last report, dated 24 September 1997 (S/1997/741), there has been no significant progress in the peace process in Angola.

40. I remain concerned in particular by the very slow pace of the demilitarization of UNITA, which is absolutely essential for the successful implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Equally, the recent slowdown of the extension of state administration into the areas controlled by UNITA is worrisome. I trust that this trend does not signal a resumed pattern of protracted delays, which were not uncommon during the previous stages of the peace process. I call on UNITA urgently to finalize arrangements for the transfer of all areas to government control and to ensure that local UNITA structures cooperate unequivocally with the newly installed government administrations. Unless additional concrete steps are taken to accelerate the implementation of the remaining tasks, including the transformation of radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility, it will be difficult to consider that UNITA has taken all steps necessary to comply with the provisions of Council resolution 1127 (1997).

41. I once again strongly urge the Government and UNITA to take a number of specific steps that could enhance mutual trust and confidence, and improve the prospects for national reconciliation. I appeal to President dos Santos and

Mr. Savimbi to meet as soon as possible inside Angola, so as to give impetus to the earliest conclusion of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

42. I also urge the Government to notify MONUA, in accordance with established procedures, of any movements of its troops. In the meantime, reports of the presence of Angolan armed elements in the Republic of the Congo are a source of serious concern. I call on all concerned to avoid any action that could exacerbate tensions in this conflict-torn country.

43. In the circumstances, I believe it would be advisable to postpone slightly the withdrawal of United Nations military formed units from Angola, as mentioned in paragraph 15 above. The present critical stage of the peace process underscores the need for further international involvement and support. It is for these reasons that I recommend that the mandate of MONUA be extended for three months, until 31 January 1998.

44. I stressed in my previous reports that the continuing goodwill of the international community depends on steady progress in the peace process. However, it is also imperative that every effort be made to ensure that the gains achieved so far are sustained and reinforced by adequate financial and material assistance from the donor community, especially for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, demining activities and other pressing humanitarian projects.

45. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and all civilian, police and military staff of MONUA, as well as to the personnel of the United Nations programmes and agencies, for their commendable work in support of the Angolan peace process.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 15 October 1997

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Total
Bangladesh	10	22	3	90	125
Brazil	19	21	1	-	41
Bulgaria	9	20	-	-	29
Congo, Republic of the	3	-	-	-	4
Egypt	10	19	1[b]	-	30
France	3	-	-	-	3
Guinea-Bissau	3	4	-	-	7
Hungary	10	8	-	-	18
India	20	17	33[b]	390	460
Jordan	17	20	1	-	38
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	19	20	-	-	39
Mali	9	20	-	-	29
Namibia	-	-	-	194	194
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	0
New Zealand	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Nigeria	16	20	-	-	36
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	7[b]	-	13
Poland	5	-	-	-	5
Portugal	4	38	6	359	414
Romania	-	-	1	150	151
Russian Federation	3	-	1	129	134
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	3	21	-	-	24
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Ukraine	5	3	2	-	10
Uruguay	3	25	4[b]	-	32
Zambia	8	15	6	497	526
Zimbabwe	13	22	25	662	722
TOTAL	226	318	92	2 471	3 117

[a] Including military police.

[b] Including military specialists in the demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

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